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NOTES

The contents of this paper reflect the author’s personal views and are not endorsed by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force or the Japanese government.

1. For example, the trident appears visually as part of the Naval War College’s seal and verbally in the name of the U.S. Navy’s current submarine-launched nuclear-armed ballistic missile.

2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 177–218.

3. Sergey Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (New York: Pergamon, 1979), p. 58; Hu Jintao, 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全 国代表大会上的报告 [“Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”], Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 8 November 2012, www.gov.cn/.

4. For example, China’s 2013 defense white paper explains the necessity of using its navy to protect Chinese overseas interests—a very Mahanian idea. 国防白皮书: 中国武装力量的 多样化运用 (全文) [“National Defense White Paper: Diversified Use of China’s Armed Forces (Full Text)”], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 16 April 2013, www.mod.gov.cn/. See also Masafumi Iida, 遠 海での作戦能力強化を図る中国海軍 [“The PLAN’s Intention to Enhance Operational Capability in Open Seas”], in 中国安全保障レポ ート2016 [China Security Report 2016] (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), pp. 6–14.

5. Liu Huaqing, 刘华清回忆录 [Memories of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Press, 2004), p. 439; Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, pp. 250–52.

6. China’s current naval strategy focuses on the combination of “offshore waters defense” and “open-seas protection,” a shift from “offshore waters defense” alone. Willard C. Frank Jr., review of Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953, by Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov, Naval War College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003); James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 24 (January–March 2005); Iida, “PLAN’s Intention,” p. 6; State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information Office, May 2015).

7. The Military Posture and Security Challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong., pp. 60–64 (2018) (prepared statement of Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., Commander, U.S. Pacific Command).

8. Ben Werner, “Destroyer USS Decatur Has Close Encounter with Chinese Warship,” USNI News, 1 October 2018, news.usni.org/.

9. “Document: Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea,” USNI News, 22 August 2016, news .usni.org/.

10. “China Releases Report on US Military Presence in Asia-Pacific, Warns of Increased Conflict Risk,” People’s Daily, 22 June 2020, en.people.cn/.

11. Michael Gilday [Adm., USN], “CNO NAVPLAN,” America’s Navy, January 2021, p. 2, navy.mil/.

12. Xiao Jinguang, 肖劲光军事文选 [Selected Military Writings of Xiao Jinguang] (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Press, 2003), p. 363.

13. Robert D. Kaplan, 地政学の逆襲 [The Revenge of Geography], Japanese ed., trans. Yuko Sakurai (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Insatsu, 2016), pp. 183–213.

14. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), pp. 7–11; Alfred T. Mahan, 海上権力史論 [The Influence of Sea Power upon History], Japanese ed., trans. Kenichi Kitamura (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1982), pp. 1–3.

15. Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific, pp. 5–7; Sergey Gorshkov, ゴルシコ フ ロシア•ソ連海軍戦略 [Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy], Japanese ed., trans. Kuniko Miyauchi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2010), pp. 243–59.

16. Xiao Jinguang, 萧劲光回忆录 [Memory of Xiao Jinguang] (Beijing: Contemporary China, 2013), pp. 215–60.

17. Xiao, Selected Military Writings, p. 363.

18. Xiao, Memory of Xiao Jinguang, pp. 215–60.

19. Keith A. Dunn, “Power Projection or Influence: Soviet Capabilities for the 1980s,” Naval War College Review 33, no. 5 (September– October 1980), pp. 31–47.

20. Gorshkov, Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy, pp. 40–52.

21. While the United States may not consider itself the “victor” of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises publicly, China clearly recognized that it was defeated owing to the stark imbalance in naval capabilities at the time—motivating its subsequent modernization and buildup.

22. Masahiro Masuda, 変化する中国の対米姿 勢 [“The Shift of Chinese Attitude toward the United States”], in 中国安全保障レポート 2018 [China Security Report 2018] (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2018), p. 6.

23. Aaron L. Friedberg,* Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia* (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2014), pp. 15–24.

24. Ibid., pp. 24–39.

25. H. I. Sutton and Sam LaGrone, “China Builds Missile Targets Shaped Like U.S. Aircraft Carrier, Destroyers in Remote Desert,” USNI News, 7 November 2021, new.usni.org/.

26. M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015).

27. Milan Vego, Disputing Sea Control, NWC 1139 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, June 2015), p. 11.

28. Outside Japan, the gap between Okinawa and the Miyako Islands is often called the Miyako Strait; Japan does not consider the area to be international waters. Defense Ministry, Defense of Japan 2018 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2018), p. 108, fig. I-2-3-5.

29. Ibid., p. 105, fig. I-2-3-4.

30. Bernard Cole, “Does Mahan Help Us Understand China’s Maritime Strategy?,” review of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Asia Policy 12 (July 2011), pp. 153–57.

31. Keitaro Ushirogata, 海洋領域における軍事 戦略の変遷に関する比較研究1980~2017 年: 領域拒否、SLOC防衛/SLOC妨害、 戦力投射の観点から [“The Comparing Research of Transition of Military Strategy in Maritime Region from 1980 to 2017: The Perspective of the Area Denial, SLOC Defense/ Obstruction, and Power Projection”] (PhD diss., National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2017), available at grips.ac.jp/.

32. Gorshkov, Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy, p. 128.

33. The Sea of Okhotsk covers an area of approximately six hundred thousand square nautical miles; the area inside the nine-dash line is about 770,000 square nautical miles.

34. The ECS and the Yellow Sea are not deep enough to support many submarine operations, and they are close to Japan and South Korea as well. Hiroshi Ichikawa and Robert C. Beardsley, “The Current System in the Yellow and East China Seas,” Journal of Oceanography 58 (February 2002), p. 77.

35. Junichi Abe, 政策提言研究「中国軍事戦 略の趨勢と海軍」[“Research for Political Suggestions: The Tendency of Chinese Military and Naval Strategy”], Japan External Trade Organization, 2011, www.ide.go.jp/.

36. 南シナ海情勢 (中国による地形埋立•関 係国の動向) [“The Situation of the South China Sea: The Tendency of China’s Landfill and Coastal Countries’ Countermeasures”], 防衛省•自衛隊 [Japan Ministry of Defense], February 2018, www.mod.go.jp/.

37. Andrew Erickson et al., eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 183.

38. 南シナ海も核心的利益 [“The South China Sea Is Also a ‘Core Interest’—Director of the National Maritime Bureau of China”], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 October 2012, nikkei .com/.

39. Chen Shaofeng, “China’s Self-extrication from the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and Implications,”* International Journal of China Studies* 1, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 1–24.

40. Peter Navarro, 米中もし戦わば: 戦争の 地政学 [Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World], Japanese ed. (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2016), pp. 20–24; 中国の原油•石油製品の需給と輸入動向 [“China’s Tendency of Supply and Imports Regarding Crude Oil and Petroleum”], 2015 JPEC Report, no. 6, Japan Petroleum Energy Center, 22 June 2015, pecj.or.jp/.

41. “China’s Crude Oil Imports Surpassed 10 Million Barrels per Day in 2019,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 23 March 2020, eia.gov/.

42. Brian Wong, “China’s Mask Diplomacy,” China Power (blog), The Diplomat, 25 March 2020, thediplomat.com/.

43. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), pp. 87–96.

44. Masuda, “The Shift of Chinese Attitude,” p. 6.

45. For example, the nearest two-hundred-meter depth contour is only sixty nautical miles from Hainan Island. Atsushi Miyata, 中国の 海洋戦略 [Chinese Naval Strategy] (Tokyo: Hihyosha, 2014), p. 143; Damen Cook, “China’s Most Important South China Sea Military Base,” The Diplomat, 9 March 2017, thediplomat.com/.

46. Kristin Huang, “The JL-3: The New Missile ‘Raising the Cost’ of a US Fight with China,” South China Morning Post, 24 January 2021, scmp.com/; Iida, “PLAN’s Intention,” pp. 14–17; 航空宇宙産業データベース [“The Space Industry Database”], Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, July 2018, sjac.or.jp/.

47. “China’s Activities in the South China Sea (China’s Development Activities on the Features and Trends in Related Countries),” Japan Ministry of Defense, March 2021, www .mod.go.jp/; Hannah Beech, “Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From?,” Time, 19 July 2016, time.com/.

48. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, pp. 70–73.

49. Ibid., pp. 12, 74; Gorshkov, Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy, pp. 40–52.

50. Gorshkov, Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy, pp. 40–52.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 50.

53. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History (Boston: Pearson, 2017), pp. 153–59.

54. Gorshkov, Russian and Soviet Naval Strategy, p. 252.

55. Zhang Xusan explains the necessity of sea control for denying an enemy’s access to China’s littoral. However, the concept he describes is closer to denying control to an adversary than China establishing sea control itself. Thus, Hiramatsu uses sea denial in his discussion in Shigeo Hiramatsu, 甦る中 国海軍 [Recovering Chinese Navy] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1991), pp. 212–24; see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 152–54 for a discussion of sea control and sea denial.

56. Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Joint Military Operations Reference Guide (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2018), p. 10; Hiramatsu, Recovering Chinese Navy, pp. 212–24.

57. Stephen G. Xydis, “The 1945 Crisis over the Turkish Straits,” Balkan Studies 1, no. 1 (1960), pp. 65–90.

58. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” Naval War College Review 72, no. 1 (Winter 2019), p. 19.

59. Ibid.

60. “Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative,” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 30 March 2015, english.gov.cn/.

61. Satoru Nagao, “The Growing Militarization of the Indian Ocean Power Game and Its Significance for Japan,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 10 July 2018, spf.org/.

62. “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO),” U.S. Marine Corps, 2 August 2021, marines.mil/.

63. Ibid.; Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy,” pp. 19–37; Security and Strategy Research Institute of Japan, 中国の海洋侵出を抑え込 む: 日本の対中防衛戦略 [Prevent Chinese Maritime Expansion: Japanese Anti-China Defense Strategy] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 2017), p. 65; 吉布提保障基地司令员是他! 原海军发言人梁阳领命出征 [“The Commander of the Djibouti Security Base Is Him! Former Navy Spokesperson Liang Yang Led the Expedition”], Global Times, 11 July 2017, world.huanqiu.com/.

64. Ben Werner, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Now Conducting Sea Trials,” USNI News, 1 June 2020, news.usni.org/.

65. 中国の2隻目空母、20年末にも進水か [“China Plans to Have Second Aircraft Carrier in the Water in 2020”], Sankei Shimbun, 28 November 2018, sankei.com/.

66. Toshi Yoshihara, Dragon against the Sun: Chinese Views of Japanese Seapower (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), p. 11, csbaonline.org/.

67. Force withdrawal stemming from political shifts in the United States impacts U.S. forcesustainment capability. Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, “Ensuring Access and Promoting Security in the Indian Ocean,” in The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security, ed. Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 193–207.

68. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), pp. 62–63.

69. Fang Liang, 今日 “海上丝绸之路” 通道风 险有多大 [“Current Maritime Silk Road”], China Military, 11 February 2015, 81.cn/.

70. Ibid.

71. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), p. 44.

72. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 527.

73. Ryan Morgan, “US ‘Failed Miserably’ in Wargame Reportedly against China Attack on Taiwan,”* American Military News*, 27 July 2021, americanmilitarynews.com/.

74. Ibid.

75. Megan Eckstein, “Massive 2021 U.S. Naval Drills Will Include Multiple Carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups,” USNI News, 3 December 2020, news.usni.org/.

76. Seth G. Jones, “Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare,” CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 October 2018, csis .org/.

77. Narushige Michishita, Peter M. Swartz, and David F. Winkler, Lessons of the Cold War in the Pacific: U.S. Maritime Strategy, Crisis Prevention, and Japan’s Role (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2018), pp. 7–8, wilsoncenter .org/.

78. Anbarasan Ethirajan and Vikas Pandey, “China-India Border: Why Tensions Are Rising between the Neighbours,” BBC News, 29 May 2020, bbc.com/; “China at It Again! Constructs Artificial Island in Maldives Concerning India,” News Bharati, 13 May 2020, newsbharati.com/.

79. Office of the President of the United States, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: White House, 20 May 2020).

80. Codie L. Soule, “Nimitz, Reagan Demonstrate Unmatched Commitment to Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” America’s Navy, 7 July 2020, navy.mil/; Commander, Task Force 70 / Carrier Strike Group 5 Public Affairs, “Australia, Japan, Join U.S. for Trilateral Naval Exercise,” America’s Navy, 21 July 2020, navy.mil/; “People’s Republic of China Military Exercises in the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2 July 2020, defense.gov/; Michael Pompeo, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of State, 13 July 2020, state.gov/.

81. Chidanand Rajghatta, “US Flexes Military Muscle at China as Beijing Draws Down in Its Border Spat with India,” Times of India, 7 July 2020, timesofindia.com/.

82. “China’s Activities in the South China Sea.”

83. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette, 2020), p. xxix.

84. Ibid.

85. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

86. Michael Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future” (speech, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 23 July 2020), available at state .gov/.

87. White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: 2021), p. 20.

88. Alan Dupont, “The US-China Cold War Has Already Started,” Flashpoints (blog), The Diplomat, 8 July 2020, thediplomat.com/.

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