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COUNTERING CHINA’S “TRIDENT” STRATEGY - Frustrating China’s Aims in the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean

Naval War College Review

Volume 75, Number 2 Spring 2022, Article 4

2022

Kohji Kuhara

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Video: Japan Maritime Self Defense Force publicity original video ～STRENGTH & READINESS～

Recommended Citation Kuhara, Kohji (2022) “Countering China’s “Trident” Strategy—Frustrating China’s Aims in the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 75: No. 2, Article 4. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/4

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Commander Kohji Kuhara is a surface warfare officer in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). He is the executive officer of JS Kirishima and was previously the JMSDF liaison officer on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in Washington, DC. He graduated from the Naval Staff College at the Naval War College with a master’s degree in 2019.

In Greek mythology, the god Poseidon dominated the sea with a three-pronged spear—a trident—that became a symbol of naval power.¹ China now is trying to construct its own trident-like, three-pronged naval strategy for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to dominate the country’s near seas and deny U.S. forces freedom of action in the western Pacific Ocean.

To counter this, the U.S. Navy (USN) should look back fifty years to its last major strategic contest. Similar to the way the Soviet Union expanded its navy during the Cold War, China has modernized and expanded its navy dramatically since the Cold War ended. Consistent with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theories, China intends to act far from its home territory to protect its national interests.² The Soviet Union recognized, as China recognizes today, that it had to deploy its navy globally to strengthen its strategic and defensive position.³ The Soviet Union ambitiously expanded its navy from being a green-water, or coastal, force to being a blue-water navy that could operate all over the world, just as China is doing today.⁴ Both the father of the Soviet navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, and the father of the Chinese navy, Navy General Liu Huaqing, transformed their fleets into blue-water forces to operationalize Mahan’s strategic counsel to contain one’s potential adversary, and did so against the same target: the U.S. Navy.⁵ By following the Soviet navy’s model, China today (or soon) might be able to blunt a U.S. counterintervention in a potential conflict. Even in peacetime, China’s naval expansion could make the United States hesitate during an escalating crisis.

As early as 2005, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara warned about the PLAN’s 遠海防衛 (open-seas defense strategy) against U.S. operations in the western Pacific. Since then, the U.S. Navy has grown only more concerned about the PLAN’s rapid development and the ways China’s leaders might use it (see the table).⁶ The risk of a clash or conflict with China, especially in the maritime domain, has increased substantially over the last decade.⁷ For example, a Chinese warship approached within forty-five yards of an American destroyer in 2018, risking a collision that could have escalated.⁸ Given that this incident occurred after China and the United States concluded the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and other confidence-building mechanisms designed to prevent unintended incidents and clashes, it is clear that China was, and perhaps remains, comfortable with the risk attendant on an incident at sea, suggesting that the potential for escalation in a future incident is significant.⁹ China’s top Communist Party–run newspaper warned in 2020 that “US military operations easily could trigger accidents, which risks further escalations.”¹⁰ Considering the strong concern about China’s rapid military development and its aggressive activities, the U.S. Navy has designated China its “most pressing long-term strategic threat” and has begun to prioritize its efforts and capabilities to deal with the PLAN.¹¹

Because China, with its strong economy and sophisticated military, is expanding its power and influence, more effective countermeasures are necessary for the U.S. Navy to address the threat and capabilities that the PLAN poses. Since China learned a lot from Soviet naval strategy over the years, comparing the current situation with that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War may provide an important lens through which to assess Chinese strategy and develop effective countermeasures.¹²

CHANGES IN CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY

There are three useful parallels between China and the Soviet Union to guide formulation of a strategy against the former’s maritime ambitions. First, both China and the Soviet Union historically are continental powers that grew using land-based resources.¹³ Second, both countries realized naval power’s importance and developed their navies using Mahanian ideas.¹⁴ Third, both countries have (or had) defensive strategies against the United States and its partners and allies.¹⁵ Moreover, the PLAN received significant support from the Soviet navy from its establishment in 1949 until the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1960, which affected China’s strategy toward naval power.¹⁶ Xiao Jinguang, a confidant of Mao Zedong and one of China’s highest-ranking military officers, called the Soviet navy “a midwife, a nanny, and a teacher of the Chinese navy.”¹⁷ As a result, the early PLAN’s foundations—its education, tactics, and equipment—all derived from the Soviet navy, with enduring effects to this day.18 Hence, and from the beginning, the Chinese navy’s strategy also was adapted from that of its Soviet parent.

The PLAN largely operates in three key maritime areas—the East China Sea (ECS), the South China Sea (SCS), and the Indian Ocean—and these efforts represent the prongs of its trident strategy. This three-region focus echoes that of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, in the form of the Soviet navy’s approach toward Eastern Europe, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Since the U.S. Navy had considerable success against the Soviet navy during the Cold War, comparing Soviet and Chinese strategy in these regions yields important insights. Understanding the analogies between these two competitors can help the United States and its partners develop more effective countermeasures against undesirable Chinese initiatives in those three crucial geographic areas. As it did during the Cold War, the United States should increase its naval presence in those regions, to prevent further Chinese naval expansion there by maintaining a strong strategic posture, and it should offset the advantages inherent in China’s trident strategy by leveraging its allies and partners to burden share.